

810

TOP SECRET 'U'

TICOM #37

NARRATIVE AND REPORT

OF PROCEEDINGS OF

TICOM TEAM 6

11th APRIL - 6th JULY 1945

5847

TICOM  
5 Sept. 1945

No. of Pages 25

Copy No. 32

DISTRIBUTION:

British

- 1. Director
- 2. D.D.3.
- 3. D.D.4.
- 4-5. D.D.(N.S.) (2)
- 6. D.D.(M.W.)
- 7. D.D.(A.S.)
- 8-9. A.D.(C.C.R.) (2)
- 10. A.D. (Mech.)
- 11. Commander (I.C.)
- 12. D.N.I. (via Cdr. (I.C.))
- 13. Lieut.Col. Leatham
- 14. Major Morgan

U.S.

- 30-33. OP-20-G (4) (via Lt. Pendergrass)
- 34. G-2 (via Lt.Col. Hilles)
- 35-36. S.S.A. (2) (via Major Seaman)
- 37-38. Director, S.I.D. USFET (2) (via Lt.Col. Johnson)
- 39. MR FRIEDMAN
- 30. LT COMDR MANSON

TICOM

- 15. Chairman
- 16-17. S.A.C. (2)
- 18. Cdr. Bacon
- 19. Cdr. Tandy
- 20-21. Cdr. Mackenzie (2)
- 22. Lieut.Col. Johnson
- 23. Major Seaman
- 24. Lieut. Vance
- 25. Captain Cowan
- 26-29. TICOM Files (4)

DO NOT DESTROY OR MUTILATE

**RECORD COPY**

5-5100 FM JZ copy 1

Do NOT [unclear] in the NSA Technical Library when no longer needed

TOP SECRET 'U'

NARRATIVE AND REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS OF TICOM TEAM 6

- between -

11TH APRIL AND 6TH JULY 1945

Formation of Team

TICOM Team 6 was formed in February 1945 as a Joint Naval Target Reporting Team for the exploitation of Enemy Naval Sigint Targets in Europe, in particular the German Naval Intelligence Centre, thought to be located at Lanke.

TICOM Team 4 was a Joint Naval Team formed at the same time for the particular exploitation of the German Sigint H.Q., thought to be located at Eberswalde.

5847 In the event, TICOM Team 6 proceeded overseas as a joint combined Team made up of personnel from the original Teams 4 and 6, with the addition of U.S. and British Army officers.

Object of the Operation

TICOM object in sending this Team into the field was two-fold.

Firstly, to cripple German Naval Sigint organisations by the identification and neutralisation of personnel and equipment.

Secondly, to discover the exact degree of success achieved by German Naval Sigint Organisations during the war through the interrogation of captured personnel and the examination of captured documents and equipment.

Chances of Success

In March 1945, it was considered at G.C.H.Q. that the chances of capturing German Naval Sigint personnel were remote, but that the chances of capturing valuable equipment or documents were good. In either case it was evident that the holding of Prisoners or material would present the Target Reporting Officer with a considerable problem, and that to achieve any success the T.R.O. must have at his disposal a sufficient force to hold what he had taken.

In view of this, it was decided to attach Teams to local "T" Forces.

Team Attached to 30 A.U.

The Russian advance of February 1945 drove the German Naval Sigint and Intelligence organisations from their quarters in Eberswalde and Lanke, and by the middle of March it was clear from Special Intelligence that both organisations were intending to settle in the North Western Area, presumably to remain in touch with North Sea and Baltic Naval Bases.

By the end of March, when the Rhine crossings were an established success, it was clear that this area would be covered by the 21st Army Group's advance.

In view of these developments, it was decided by A.N.C.X.F. that a Naval Team for the exploitation of Sigint Targets should be attached to 30 Advanced Unit (Royal Marines), which was at this time operating in the 21st Army Group area. A.N.C.X.F. approached TICOM and TICOM decided to attach Team 6.

TOP SECRET 'U'

- 2 -

### Composition of Team

At this time the Team consisted of myself (Commander A.M.S. Mackenzie, R.N.V.R.) with Lieutenant John Nuelsen, U.S.N.R., as No. 1, and two R.N.V.R. and two U.S.N. officers. All Target Reporting Officers had been through a two months' course on the recognition and handling of Enemy Sigint Material.

The composition of the Team was changed at times throughout the period of the operation to suit changing conditions.

Experience in the field showed the great advantage of the preservation of a pool of T.R.O.s at G.C.H.Q. on which field teams could draw in emergency, and the benefits of the inclusion of specialist officers. Experience also showed that the specialist was of no great value unless he was of the highest class. In other words, when you need a photographer or a linguist in the field, you need a good one.

### Communications

Communications with G.C.H.Q. were provided by Lieutenant Colonel Pott, Royal Corps of Signals, who gave Team 6 two portable Transmitter/Receivers with generators, and two N.C.O. operators. The standard of both material and personnel was of the highest, and throughout the operation communications were maintained with no failures and no anxiety to the T.R.O.s.

Lieutenant Colonel Pott also supplied us with two drivers, who proved invaluable.

Throughout the whole period the Royal Corps of Signals personnel worked willingly and hard under strange and sometimes difficult conditions, and are deserving of commendation.

### Transport

The Team's transport consisted of two British and two U.S. vehicles. The former, a three-ton Bedford 2 x 4, and a Hillman Utilicon, were provided through the good offices of Lieutenant Commander Bloodworth, R.N., of D.S.D. He also provided a great deal of the Team's equipment. The American vehicles, a Dodge six-wheel personnel carrier and a Jeep, were made available by the U.S. Navy Depot at Le Havre, through the good offices of Lieutenant Eachus, U.S.N.R.

This peculiar combination of vehicles proved most effective for all purposes. There were no major breakdowns, and the only persistent trouble was a Dynamo bracket bolt which sheared occasionally in the Jeep, but which was eventually put right. As an example of the work done by these vehicles, the Utilicon, which was the vehicle most unsuited to the conditions, and which I used myself throughout, averaged over a thousand miles a week for longer than a month without any defect whatever.

Credit is again due for care and sensible handling to the Royal Corps of Signals drivers.

### Equipment

The Team was intended to be entirely self-contained and consequently carried a considerable amount of miscellaneous stores and equipment. As none of this equipment was lost, and all returned in good shape to G.C.H.Q., there is no point in enumerating it.

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority: 3100  
Date: 11/11/00

TOP SECRET 'U'

- 3 -

Achievement of Objective

The object in sending the Team into the field, as stated above, was achieved to the following extent:-

Firstly, all German Naval Cryptanalysts were identified, and of these, two-thirds (including all the senior ones) were held for interrogation by the party of specialists sent out later from G.C.H.Q.

Also, all officers involved in the servicing of Special Intelligence, in the construction and security of German Naval Cyphers, and in the German Naval 'Y' Service, were identified and such as were of value held for interrogation as above.

Secondly, all undestroyed German Naval cryptanalytic machinery and documents were located, and such as lay in the British or American zones of occupation recovered.

Thirdly, the experimental "Kurier" station at Bokel was exploited and the "Kurier" specialist personnel handed over to an officer of D.S.D. who had been sent out to interrogate them.

Fourthly, senior cryptanalytic personnel of OKW/Chi were identified and handed over to the Army authorities to be held for interrogation, and later despatched to U.K., and OKW/Chi records were located at Bad Schliersee.

Fifthly, continuous information on Sigint and other German Naval Targets was passed to 30 A.U. Teams in the field, resulting in the capture of a considerable number of confidential books and papers of value to TICOM and Admiralty, including one particularly valuable set of bigram tables.

Debt to 30 A.U.

This degree of success could never have been achieved without the support and good offices of 30 A.U., to whom the Team was attached. At all times and in many places, Colonel Quill, R.M., and his first Lieutenant, Lieutenant Commander Tamplin, R.N.V.R., provided transport, shelter, food, drink and entertainment when they were needed most, as well as the troops necessary for guarding and exploiting the German Naval 'Y' Station at Neumuenster.

And to the OKM Control Commission

The very great assistance rendered by Captain Maund, Naval Adviser to the SHAEF Mission in Flensburg, and Lieutenant Commander Karminski, R.N.V.R., S.O.(I) to the OKM Control Commission, in seeing that the Team had an unrestricted chance to exploit OKM 4/SKL III, must also be placed on the record.

TOP SECRET 'U'

- 4 -

TICOM Team 6 Personnel

The following officers and men were at some time with Team 6:-

Commander A.M.S. Mackenzie, R.N.V.R.	O.C.
Lieutenant John Nuelsen, U.S.N.R.	No.1

T.R.O.s

R.N.V.R.

Lieutenant Commander L.A. Griffiths  
Lieutenant H. Lorton  
Sub Lieutenant E. Morgan

U.S.N.

Lieut. (j.g.) M. Gaschk  
Ensign P. Phillips

A.U.S.

Major W.F. Edgerton  
Lieutenant O.R. Kirby  
Lieutenant L. Laptook

Lieutenant G.H. Evans (I. Corps)  
Major E.K. Morrison (I. Corps)  
Captain M.J.M. Horsfield (Worcesters)

Royal Signals

Corporal Roberts  
Corporal Tansley  
Driver Fisher  
Driver Hewetson.

A.M.S. MACKENZIE  
Commander, R.N.V.R.

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority: 2025  
Date: 11/14/2025  
By: NARA, Con 11/14/25

TOP SECRET 'U'

- 5 -

APPENDIX I TO TICOM TEAM 6 REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS

NARRATIVE

First Visit to 30 A.U., 7.4.45 to 13.4.45.

To implement the decision of A.N.C.X.F. to attach a TICOM Team of Target Reporting Officers to 30 A.U., Lieutenant Commander Fawcett, R.N.V.R., of N.I.D.30, visited G.C.H.Q. on 7.4.45, where it was decided that he and I should cross at the earliest opportunity to Venlo, where 30 A.U. Formation H.Q. was located at that time. The object in this visit was to consult with Colonel Quill, R.M., on ways and means of achieving TICOM objectives.

On 10.4.45 we met Commander Fleming, R.N.V.R. (P.A. to D.N.I.) in Admiralty and informed him of the proposed visit.

On 11.4.45 we flew to Brussels and went on to Venlo by road, reaching Formation H.Q. at 2330.

12.4.45: The morning was spent in discussion and visits. The whole TICOM scheme, in broad outline, was put before Colonel Quill in about an hour. He agreed that the proposition was a practical one, but suggested modifications. Chief of these was that the Team should be kept as small as possible to begin with and should include at least one Army officer; this in order to gain the benefits from "Joint Combined".

It was clear that the main difficulties were to be communications and transport. Colonel Quill agreed to provide both to the extent of 30 A.U.'s resources until such time as TICOM Team 6 could bring communications and transport into the field.

We then went over to 21 A.G. Main H.G. at Suechteln to make contact with Brigadier Williams (G.S.I.) and Lieutenant Colonel Winterbotham's party. These officers were informed of the general scope of the project and of the intention to bring a S.C.U. into the field with the TICOM Team.

In the light of all these conversations, it was agreed that the most practical plan was to bring out a small "Joint Combined" holding party as soon as possible in case any of the 30 A.U. Teams in the field should overrun a Sigint Target worthy of exploitation.

The afternoon of 12.4.45 was spent in a visit to Krefeld and the East bank of the Rhine to get some idea of the conditions under which Teams might be working in the field.

13.4.45: Flew with Lieutenant Commander Fawcett from Vorst to Croydon and was back at G.C.H.Q. by 2100. Found that A.C.O.S.(I) to A.N.C.X.F. had ordered a TICOM Team to be attached to 30 A.U. immediately.

TICOM Team 6 joins 30 A.U., 14.4.45 to 17.4.45.

In view of arrangements with Colonel Quill as above, I endeavoured to keep the party that was to join immediately as small as possible. On 14.4.45 it was agreed that the following officers could leave the next day:-

Commander A.M.S. Mackenzie, R.N.V.R.  
Lieutenant John Nuelsen, U.S.N.R.  
Lieutenant Commander L.A. Griffiths, R.N.V.R.  
and Lieutenant Colonel G. Evans (I.Corps)

Attached to these officers was Corporal Roberts, Royal Corps of Signals, with communications gear.

TOP SECRET 'U'

- 6 -

15.4.45: The party left G.C.H.Q. at 0530, flew from Croydon to Brussels, and proceeded in a 30 A.U. three-tonner to Venlo, arriving 1800.

16.4.45: Got SCU "BARNY" set up in the Monastery at Venlo. In the afternoon I took the opportunity of making the officers known to Lieutenant Colonel Winterbotham's party. While at Army Group I was fortunate to meet Colonel Scott, who had come up from Paris, and was able to tell him of progress already made and future prospects. He registered surprise.

17.4.45: Holding party and communications being in position, the next job was to collect transport. The U.S. vehicles were due at Antwerp on this day, and at 0800 Lieutenant Nuelsen and I left for Antwerp. Some Marine drivers for 30 A.U. were due at Ostend on the same day and it was decided to take the opportunity afforded to get TICOM vehicles up to Venlo in this way.

At Antwerp we found our vehicles not yet arrived but due any minute. I left Lieutenant Nuelsen at Navy House to await vehicles and arrival of drivers from Ostend, and proceeded to Brussels with the object of returning to G.C.H.Q. to get the British vehicles.

Flew from Brussels 1545 and arrived G.C.H.Q. 2100.

In the evening, SCU "BARNEY" made first contact with Windy Ridge.

Holding Team Settling in, 18.4.45 to 3.5.45.

In this period there was not much chance of a major Naval Sigint target being uncovered, as the ex-Eberswalde target was thought to be in the Wilhelmshaven area. This was the main target, OKM 4/SKL III. However, there were good chances at any time of minor Sigint targets, forward exploiting centres for example, being overrun by 30 A.U. Field Teams working up the Dutch coast. In view of this, I left instructions with Lieutenant Nuelsen to get about as much as possible and pick up such experience of working with 30 A.U. Field Teams as was available.

In England all efforts were concentrated on raising vehicles and equipment.

The Committee accepted the principle of a "holding Team" and was forming one for the 12th Army Group Area. It was proposed to attach Lieutenant Colonel Evans to this Team as soon as possible to give them the benefit of the experience of the party at Venlo.

18.4.45: Lieutenant Nuelsen returned from Antwerp to Venlo with the American vehicles, a jeep and a six-wheel Dodge personnel carrier.

Team 6 informed TICOM by signal that Colonel Scott had arranged a meeting in Paris for 23.4.45, which Lieutenant Colonel Evans would attend. This was to discuss formation of a Southern holding Team.

19.4.45: TICOM informed Team 6 of possible targets in Groeningen. Lieutenant Nuelsen and Lieutenant Commander Griffiths proceeded to Groeningen, but could only contact a few D/F personnel. They returned to Venlo the same day. 30 A.U. Team on the spot reported the target as destroyed.

TOP SECRET 'U'

- 7 -

20.4.45: Lieutenant Colonel Evans left Venlo to investigate a possible target in the Sulingen area.

At G.C.H.Q. it was decided to reinforce the Team in the field by Ensign Phillips, U.S.N., to help with transport, and Sub Lieutenant Morgan, R.N.V.R., for communications. Major Edgerton, A.U.S., was also to join on his way to the Southern holding party with Lieutenant Colonel Evans.

21.4.45: Phillips, Morgan and Edgerton reached Venlo. At G.C.H.Q. I made a report on the Team's progress and possibilities to D.D.(1). Lieutenant Colonel Pott made a great improvement in the communications and transport situation by making available at 21 A.G. another Receiver/Transmitter with generator, as well as an operator and two drivers.

22.4.45: 30 A.U. Teams were now as far forward as Buxtehude and the Harz pocket. Immediate intelligence of targets in these areas and at Ploen was provided by TICOM.

Also, on this day, it became clear at G.C.H.Q. that the general bigram tables would change on 5.5.45 and, as the tables due to come into force ("Flusslauf") had never been seen, it was decided that the pinching of "Flusslauf" should be given to teams in the field as a job of first priority.

23.4.45: Lieutenant Colonel Pott's operator and drivers joined the Team at Venlo.

24.4.45: Two Bedford three-tonners and two Utilicons were made available on paper to TICOM, and it was decided to get one of each out to Team 6 as soon as possible.

Passage was arranged via Tilbury-Ostend for 30.4.45.

25.4.45: Lieutenant Goodman, R.N.V.R., on his way to Paris, passed the information about "Flusslauf" to Lieutenant Commander Griffiths at Brussels airport.

Lieutenant Nuelsen reported that he had requested permission from SHAEF to visit the "Marinenachrichtarsenal" at Thale/Harz and Halle. TICOM at once ordered TICOM personnel not to move to distant targets unless they were confirmed as "Sigint". The signal for Team 6, however, arrived too late to stop Lieutenant Nuelsen and Major Edgerton.

26.4.45: Lieutenant Nuelsen and Major Edgerton left Venlo for Georgs Marienhutte, near Osnabrueck, where 30 A.U. had an advanced base. The object in this expedition was rather to gain experience than in the hope of finding anything.

27.4.45: The party arrived at Georgs Marienhutte after continuous delays from jeep trouble.

28.4.45: The party proceeded to Brunswick to obtain the papers necessary for their visit. There was, as always at this time, doubt as to the boundary line between 21st and 12th A.G. areas.



TOP SECRET 'U'

- 8 -

29.4.45: The party proceeded to Thale and discovered no Sigint material of any kind at the target and so decided to return to Venlo.

In England the vehicles for TICOM were collected by drivers borrowed from N.I.D.30 from Naval Transport Stores at Devonport and Chiswick.

30.4.45: One three-tonner and one Utilicon were selected and, after loading up, I moved off to Tilbury transit camp with Lieutenant (j.g.) Gaschk, U.S.N., who was coming out as an addition to the strength of Team 6, and who was travelling with me to drive the second vehicle.

1.5.45: Lieutenant Gaschk and I, driving the Utilicon and the three-tonner, joined LST at Tilbury.

Lieutenant Nuelsen and Major Edgerton returned to Venlo and TICOM informed Team 6 by signal of the location of the "Kurier" experimental station at Bokel, near Neumuenster.

2.5.45: I reached Ostend with Lieutenant Gaschk and the transport, and pushed on to Antwerp.

Major Edgerton left Team 6 and proceeded to Paris.

TICOM informed Team 6 of the movement of the German Naval War Staff to Flensburg Muerwick.

3.5.45: I reached Venlo with the transport. Lieutenant Nuelsen was already preparing to move further forward as, in view of the expected collapse of German resistance, valuable targets might become exposed at any time.

The Location of the two Main Targets, "Flusslauf" and 4/SKL III  
4.5.45 to 15.5.45.

This period tested the communications and transport arrangements to the utmost. It was clear by the 4th of May that a German collapse was imminent, and such a collapse would undoubtedly expose all the best TICOM targets at one time. It was also clear that arrangements would have to be made to keep part of the Team as far forward as was possible so that they should be at all times close to the primary target, OKM 4/SKL III, while, at the same time, some part of the Team would have to remain well back and in contact with 21st Army Group Main Headquarters in order to scan such material as was coming in from the 30 A.U. Field Teams, to identify "Flusslauf" when it appeared, and to get it transported to G.C.H.Q. with the utmost despatch.

This division of forces would obviously necessitate division of transport and communications but, as Lieutenant Colonel Pott had particularly requested that the two S.C.U.s, BARNY and CALIF, should not be operated at the same time, it was decided that the forward party should manage as well as they could with 30 A.U. communications and the rear party should keep S.C.U. BARNY as near to 30 A.U. Formation Headquarters as was reasonably possible. In this way the forward party, by keeping in contact with 30 A.U. forward parties, could remain in touch with the rear party who, in turn, would be in constant touch with G.C.H.Q.

The problem of transport was simpler because the vehicles divided themselves naturally between the two parties, the Jeep and the Dodge personnel carrier going forward and the three-tonner and the Utilicon remaining behind.

TOP SECRET 'U'

- 9 -

In view of the anticipated German collapse, TICOM suggested on the 3rd of May that the party should be strengthened by the addition of two British and two American Army officers in order to allow for a wider dispersal of forces. Colonel Quill thought the Army officers would be a help in every way, and it was arranged that the four Army officers should fly out at the earliest opportunity.

4.5.45: In the morning, Lieutenant Nuelsen pushed off with the forward party, which consisted of Lieutenant Commander Griffiths, Ensign Phillips, one driver, the spare receiver/transmitter, and one operator. The plan was to push forward in the Jeep and the Dodge personnel carrier and join up with one of the 30 A.U. Field Teams which was working towards Hamburg. The forward party reached Georgs Marienhuetten that evening with the intention of moving on to the new 30 A.U. H.Q. which was being prepared at Minden. At Georgs Marienhuetten, however, it was decided at Colonel Quill's request to push on directly to Hamburg.

5.5.45: The forward party left Georgs Marienhuetten at 0730. The transmitter/receiver and the operator were left behind on the understanding that the 30 A.U. personnel moving from Georgs Marienhuetten to Minden would take them along with them. The forward party reached Buxtehude at 1300, and by 1600 had contacted the 30 A.U. Team under Major Evans, R.M., which was placed at their disposal by Colonel Quill. A situation report was despatched for the rear party, which was still at Venlo awaiting the arrival of the Army officers and/or news of the appearance of "Flusslauf".

During this day I went over from Venlo to 21st Army Group H.Q. and reported the movement forward to Lieutenant Colonel Winterbotham's party. While at H.Q. I ran into Lieutenant Colonel Brown, who had come up from Paris, and explained the general situation to him.

6.5.45: The forward party, finding the situation at Hamburg more settled than was expected, pushed on with Colonel Quill's party to Luebeck, where they went directly to 8th Corps H.Q. The general situation as far forward as Luebeck was naturally very confused, but a conference at 8th Corps H.Q. made it clear that the main TICOM target area, which lay in the centre of Schleswig-Holstein, was closed to military personnel pending the outcome of conferences between the Russian and Allied command. In spite of this, Colonel Quill wangled permission for a small party of officers to enter the target area. Lieutenant Nuelsen accompanied this party, leaving Lieutenant Commander Griffiths, Ensign Phillips and the 30 A.U. Team in Luebeck. Once away from Luebeck, Colonel Quill and Lieutenant Nuelsen made straight for the 'Y' Station at Neumuenster, where it was known that 4/SKL III had stopped for some time on their way to Flensburg Muerwick. The 'Y' Station was reached at 1700, and one German Naval officer was found in charge. A quick inspection showed that 4/SKL III had finally left for Flensburg on the 4th, had destroyed all papers they did not take with them, but had left considerable machinery and equipment which would make the target well worth investigating. The party returned to Neumuenster and occupied a billet there.

Meanwhile, at Venlo I had decided to move the rear party forward as far as Minden, where a 30 A.U. party had arrived on 5.5.45 to set up H.Q. I took Lieutenant Gaschk with me in the Utilicon and reached Minden at about 1500, where I expected to find the forward party (the situation report of the 5th of May had, of course, not got back to Venlo by this time). Finding no sign of the forward party at Minden, we went back to Georgs Marienhuetten and there spent the night. To our surprise, nothing seemed to be known about the forward party there, though somebody seemed to have a vague idea that a couple of American officers had been through in the last day or so. As it was, the operator and receiver/transmitter were still at Georgs Marienhuetten, but since the officers' mess was some way off from the men's quarters, we never ran into them and in the general confusion nobody in the officers' mess was aware of their existence. In view of the disappearance of the forward

party, we decided that they had pushed off to Hamburg with Colonel Quill, as was in fact the case, and prepared to return to Venlo the next day to pick up the Army officers, Lieutenant Morgan, and SCU "BARNY" for transport to Minden.

7.5.45: In the morning, Lieutenant Nuelsen returned from Neumuenster to the 'Y' Station and arranged with the German Naval officer who had been left in charge that everything should be kept intact, and that quarters inside the 'Y' Station should be made available for a fairly large Team. He then returned to Luebeck, and Major Evans with Lieutenant Commander Griffiths and Ensign Phillips and half of "A" Troop, Royal Marines, left for Neumuenster to set up the advanced TICOM Headquarters in the target. From Luebeck Lieutenant Nuelsen went with Colonel Quill to Ploen, where part of the German Naval War Staff had spent some time in the Naval hospital. A brief examination showed that such material as had not been destroyed had been stored in the basement of one wing of the hospital. They left instructions to seal all material in the basement, pending the return of an exploitation party. Colonel Quill and Lieutenant Nuelsen then went over to Neumuenster where the party under Major Evans were settling in. Lieutenant Nuelsen remained at Neumuenster, and Colonel Quill went on to Kiel. The entire target area was still unoccupied by the Allied forces.

On the morning of the 7th I returned to Venlo with Lieutenant Gaschk, and there received the report of proceedings that the forward party had sent down from Hamburg on the 5th. At the same time, a report had come in from one of the 30 A.U. Teams in Bremerhaven, who had managed to capture a German destroyer whole, with all confidential books. I assumed that "Flusslauf" would be in this haul, and arranged by a signal on the 30 A.U. network that the whole pinch should be sent at the earliest possible opportunity to Minden, where I proposed to return on the next day.

8.5.45: The Army officers had still not arrived, but I decided not to wait for them, and pushed off again for Minden with Lieutenant Gaschk. We arrived at lunch time, and during the afternoon the pinch came in from Bremerhaven. It was found to contain absolutely everything except "Flusslauf", the reason for the absence of the current bigram tables being that Z 29 (the captured destroyer) was refitting and was not due to be ready for sea for a matter of three weeks. However, it was decided that the pinch was of such value that it would be worth running the books down to Venlo in order to catch a 30 A.U. officer flying to England.

On the evening of this day, the four Army officers reached Venlo.

At Neumuenster the forward party were starting the business of exploitation, and meanwhile, Lieutenant Commander Griffiths and Ensign Phillips went with Major Evans to Bokel, about 15 miles north of Neumuenster, where we had been informed by TICOM that the "Kurier" experimental Station was situated. Here they found an officer and two N.C.O.s who appeared to have experience of "Kurier" procedure. Later in the day, two German Naval officers belonging to 4/SKL turned up at Neumuenster, carrying an order from OKM to collect and remove to Flensburg several sets of automatic wireless intercept recorders. Since both these officers were connected with 4/SKL III, and said so, and since their orders had no Allied authorisation whatever, it was decided to remove them to Kiel and leave them in the custody of the 30 A.U. Team that was settled in the Waltherwerke.

9.5.45: The Army officers spent the night at Venlo, and on the morning of the 9th, Lieutenant Morgan loaded up the three-tonner with all our equipment and SCU "BARNY" and started off with the whole party for Minden. At the same time I left Minden with the pinch for Venlo.

TOP SECRET 'U'

- 11 -

Meanwhile, Lieutenant Nuelsen, Lieutenant Commander Griffiths and Ensign Phillips went from Neumuenster to the Waltherwerke in Kiel. Colonel Quill had decided that it would be worth the risk of a visit to Flensburg to find out what was happening in OKM, and to endeavour to make some sort of contact with 4/SKL. He took Lieutenant Nuelsen and Lieutenant Commander Griffiths with him on this expedition, and left Ensign Phillips in Kiel because, by this time, our lines of communication, which spread from Flensburg to Venlo, were getting pretty thin.

Flensburg at this time was the seat of OKW as well as OKM, and also of the provisional German government. It was still unoccupied by Allied troops as was the whole of Schleswig-Holstein. The party arrived in Flensburg in the middle of the day and contacted the Mayor, who put them on to the Military Commander of the Flensburg area, Kapt.z.See Luth, who provided an escort to take them to the OKM offices, which were set up in the officers' training school near Gluecksburg. Finding themselves arrived in the centre of everything, the TICOM representatives decided that the best thing to do was to ask for a complete personnel and section outline of the German Signals Division, and this they did, but the representative of Grand Admiral Doenitz pointed out that this request had already been made by SHAEF Headquarters, and that all signal data had been flown to SHAEF Headquarters by a German Naval officer. This was all rather difficult. The TICOM representatives felt that, as the matter was being dealt with by SHAEF directly, and as they were not supposed to be anywhere in the neighbourhood, no further action could be taken. A useful letter was obtained from OKM, stating that all information was to be made available to the Allied representatives, and the party then proceeded to the Hamburg-Amerika liner "Patria", where quarters for the officers were arranged.

10.5.45: The next day Colonel Quill returned to Kiel and the forward party returned to Neumuenster after making a brief "goodwill visit" across the Danish border. The two German Naval officers who were held at Kiel were returned to Flensburg, as nobody could really think what to do with them. The whole question of occupying targets and taking prisoners was complicated throughout the whole of the target area by the fact that no part of the area had been taken over by the Allies, and the Germans remained in complete occupation of all military buildings and equipment, and were still fully armed.

Meanwhile, on the 10th I returned from Venlo to Minden, where the whole of the rear party was now collected. I met the Army officers for the first time, and decided that at the earliest opportunity we would send Major Morrison and Lieutenants Laptook and Kirby, as well as Lieutenant Morgan and the communications gear forward to Neumuenster in the three-tonner. I decided to keep Captain Horsfield with me, as he had a long experience of the special wireless unit business and would be useful in diplomatic contacts with local Army groups.

11.5.45: The next move was to inform the 12th Army of the arrival of a "pirate" SCU in their area, and of the location of the various TICOM representatives in Schleswig-Holstein. With this in view, Captain Horsfield and I pushed off for Lueneburg to make the situation clear.

The forward party, meantime, made another visit to Bokel to see that the "Kurier" personnel were all safe and sound, and in the evening it was decided that Lieutenant Nuelsen should get back to the rear party at Minden as quickly as possible to report in detail the complicated situation in the target area, leaving Lieutenant Commander Griffiths in charge at Neumuenster to continue with the exploitation of that target.

TOP SECRET 'U'

- 12 -

12.5.45: Captain Horsfield and I spent the night fraternising at 12th Army H.Q., and in the morning returned to Minden. At the same time, Lieutenant Nuelsen had left Neumuenster and joined us at Minden H.Q. in the evening. It was decided that Lieutenant Nuelsen should be got back to G.C.H.Q. at the earliest possible opportunity in order to put before TICOM the difficulties of exploitation caused by the capitulation.

13.5.45: As a 30 A.U. scout car was about to leave Minden for Venlo at noon, it was decided that Lieutenant Nuelsen should travel with this party in order to try and work an air passage from the 21st Army Group airfield, if possible for the next morning. In order to fit Lieutenant Nuelsen into the scout car, a certain amount of mining equipment and handbooks, which were on their way back to England from one of the North Sea ports, had to be offloaded and dumped in the hall at Minden. During the afternoon this material was examined, mainly out of curiosity, and, to the very great surprise of the whole party, the first handbook that came out was "Flusslauf". The bigram tables were immediately photographed, and it was decided to fly Captain Horsfield down to Vorst before dark in order to catch Lieutenant Nuelsen on the airfield in the morning. All local wire-pulling proved unavailing, and so I decided to motor him down with the pinch during the night.

14.5.45: We got down to Army Group Headquarters in 5½ hours and caught Lieutenant Nuelsen on the road near the airfield. After handing over the bigram tables, Captain Horsfield and I returned to Minden, and Lieutenant Nuelsen left for England.

During the day, Lieutenant Morgan, with SCU "BARNY" and the three Army officers, moved in the three-tonner from Minden to Neumuenster.

15.5.45: Captain Horsfield and I left Minden and reached Neumuenster in the evening and, for the first time, the whole of Team 6 was together, with the exception of Lieutenant Nuelsen who had left for G.C.H.Q. We found the forward party hard at work exploiting the Neumuenster target and the "Kurier" Station at Bokel.

Contact made with OKM 4/SKL, and the Preliminary Investigations into the Affairs of 4/SKL II and III, 16.5.45 to 26.5.45.

After "Flusslauf" had been despatched for England and the main target at Neumuenster with subsidiary targets in Ploen, Husum and Quickborn had been investigated, it was clear that nothing remained to be done except to bag the personnel of 4/SKL II and III, who would be valuable for interrogation. As far as we could see from the targets themselves, the personnel of 4/SKL had made a practice of destroying all documents that they could not carry with them each time they left one of their stopping places on the journey from Eberswalde, through Aurich and Neumuenster, to Flensburg, and though it was more than possible that secret dumps might have been made, I felt that it would be impossible to trace them in any way other than direct interrogation. As to the nature of this interrogation, it was not intended in any way to interrogate cryptanalytic personnel on their work, but merely to discover who were the cryptanalytic personnel and where they were. At this time the general TICOM policy was that in no circumstances could interrogation on cryptanalytic matters be undertaken in the field and, in fact, when Lieutenant Commander Griffiths had asked for an interrogator to tackle the two 4/SKL III prisoners whom he had taken at Neumuenster, TICOM had specifically informed us that such interrogation was out of the question. The problem, therefore, was to locate the individual members of 4/SKL II and III who would be of value, and get them into some place where they could be interrogated. From all the evidence in our possession at this time, the valuable members of these parties were in or near Flensburg, but as we were

TOP SECRET 'U'

- 13 -

quite uncertain whether any Allied controlling personnel had got as far as that town, we imagined that day by day they would be trickling away and making for their homes, which might be anywhere. It was clear, therefore, that we could not wait for the Army to take these people over in the normal way, but would have to push on and do what we could ourselves.

Colonel Quill had left by the beginning of this period on a visit to Admiralty in order to get some decision on the future of his unit, but we had already seen what he had achieved by wangling, and decided that as soon as we could get any idea of the exact whereabouts of 4/SKL, we would try to get in touch with them on our own. I decided that for the time being we would keep the Team at Neumuenster and operate from there, even though it was a good two hours' run from Flensburg. The reason for this was that the half troop of Marines under Major Evans could best be accommodated there and they afforded a valuable protection for the equipment that we were collecting to send back to G.C.H.Q. Also Neumuenster was near to Bokel. The fact that we had discovered the Bokel target, which was obviously of immense value to D.S.D., left us in a position where we had to nurse it till some officer of the Signals Division could be found to take it over. This was a serious distraction. In the end it turned out well and the personnel were handed over successfully to an officer of the Signals Division for interrogation, but this was more due to good luck than to good management, as this interrogator had come into the area entirely as a speculator, and had no idea that the "Kurier" Station was at Bokel.

Looking at the situation as a whole, I decided to settle the affairs of Bokel first, if it could be done quickly, and then go for 4/SKL at the first opportunity.

16.5.45: On the morning after arrival at Neumuenster, therefore, I went over to Bokel with Lieutenant Commander Griffiths and Ensign Phillips, who understood the "Kurier" business, to talk to Lieutenant Poeschke, who was in charge of the Station. It turned out that he and the two N.C.O.s with him were completely informed on "Kurier" equipment and procedure, and so we decided that the best thing to do was to get Poeschke and the better of the men back to England for interrogation. TICOM had been informed of the situation and agreed to their removal. In the afternoon I went with Major Evans, Lieutenant Commander Griffiths and Captain Horsfield to Kiel. Our first visit was to the S.S. "Milwaukee", where F.O.I.C. Kiel had his headquarters, to make contact and to arrange air transport if possible for Poeschke and the N.C.O. The S.O.(I) to F.O.I.C. Kiel turned out to be Commander Frank Beasley, R.N., who was a member of Naval Section in 1940-41, and so everything was made very simple, except that he had no more idea of how to get an air passage out of Kiel than we had. The port party had only been in a matter of days, and there was the normal amount of confusion. After this, the party proceeded to the Waltherwerke where 30 A.U. had a H.Q., and where we met Lieutenant Connell, R.N.V.R., of the Field Interrogation Unit and late of N.I.D.1. I discussed with him the prospects of a visit to Flensburg, and we decided to go up together on the 18th to attempt contact with the 4/SKL party. The party then returned to Neumuenster. In the evening we decided to wangle a passage for Poeschke through 12th Army, and we also decided that Lieutenant Commander Griffiths should travel to England with him, taking a few documents of value that we had accumulated since the departure of Lieutenant Nuelsen.

17.5.45: Leaving Lieutenant Commander Griffiths to get on with the Bokel business, I went back to Kiel in the morning with Captain Horsfield. We paid a visit to the "Milwaukee" just to keep in touch, and then went on to the Waltherwerke. Here we found that Lieutenant Connell had already pushed off for Flensburg, and so we thought we would go along too and see what was going on. We got to Flensburg shortly after lunch without any difficulty, and set to work to find Captain Maund, R.N., who was the Naval adviser to the SHAEF Commission. In looking for Captain Maund, we finally reached the

Naval Officers' Training School near Flensburg, where the main body of OKM was located at that time and, finding a building which had a British and a German sentry outside, went in to have a look round. In the corridor we met Lieutenant Connell who had discovered that the whole of 4/SKL under their C.O., Rear Admiral Krauss, were living in the Signals School at Flensburg Muerwick, and had so far not been approached by anyone. The credit for keeping investigators off 4/SKL is entirely due to Lieutenant Commander Karminski, R.N.V.R., S.O.(I) to the OKM Control Commission, who had realised their value and was expecting that somebody would turn up before very long to cope with them. We decided at once to get back to the Signals School and see what we could see.

When we had got into the Signals School we decided to start first on Captains Kupfer and Lucan, but as we could not find either of them we, in the end, tackled Rear Admiral Krauss. This turned out to be much the best thing we could have done. Admiral Krauss took the party into his sitting room and, with Lieutenant Connell acting as interpreter, I put the general outline of our requirements before him and he agreed at once that everything asked for should be supplied. He explained the main divisions of his department, 4/SKL II under Captain Lucan, which covered 'Y' intercept and the security of German Naval cyphers, and 4/SKL III, commonly called the Presse Abteilung, under Captain Kupfer, which covered the Naval cryptanalytic and intelligence sections. I explained to Admiral Krauss that our main business lay with Captain Kupfer, but that a plan of Captain Lucan's intercept network was essential to the investigation, and a further meeting was arranged with Admiral Krauss and Captains Lucan and Kupfer for Saturday, the 19th, in the afternoon.

This meeting with Admiral Krauss was of the greatest importance for the future success of the operation. While walking along the corridor, Lieutenant Connell asked me how we intended to take these interviews. I felt myself that the only thing to do was to follow the lead of Admiral Krauss, that is to say, if he proved amenable we would be pleasant and helpful, if he proved obstructive, we would be just as unpleasant as he was. As it turned out, he was rather scared and very polite, and so were we, and from this original meeting the whole tone of the future relationship between TICOM Team 6 and 4/SKL III was set. After the interview the party went back to Neumuenster.

18.5.45: While all this was going on, Lieutenant Commander Griffiths had arranged with 12th Army to fly out with Lieutenant Poeschke and the N.C.O. early on the 19th. On the 18th, therefore, Poeschke and the N.C.O. were removed (they were quite willing) from Bokel to Neumuenster where they spent the night. By a great piece of luck, the D.S.D. "Kurier" investigator turned up at Neumuenster looking for some dinner on the same evening, and so got in a very good three hours' interrogation of both the prisoners. Just before midnight, a signal was received from TICOM instructing us not to send Poeschke after all, as a general change in the policy towards interrogation of prisoners in the field was impending. We decided that Lieutenant Commander Griffiths must still fly out because there was a certain amount of secret material of immediate value to be carried, and I was most anxious not to cancel an air passage which had been arranged by pulling all possible strings.

19.5.45: Lieutenant Commander Griffiths left for Lueneburg first thing in the morning, and while the rest of the Team continued packing, docketing and photographing the Neumuenster material; I set off for Flensburg with Major Evans, R.M. and Captain Horsfield. A second party, consisting of Major Morrison and Lieutenant Kirby came along too, in order to contact Royal Corps of Signals Officers who were working on OKW, and through them to locate some members of OKW/Chi, who were thought to be lying up in the Flensburg area. We lunched at the torpedo testing station in Eckernfoerde, where 30 A.U. were setting up a forward H.Q.

On arrival in Flensburg both parties tried to contact Brigadier Foord, who was away in Brussels. I then took my party to the Signals School, where we had arranged to meet Lieutenant Connell in the first courtyard. We met as arranged, and went in to tackle Admiral Krauss and Captains Lucan and Kupfer. At the meeting a plan for preliminary interrogations was worked out, and Captains Lucan and Kupfer were asked to produce diagrams of the working of their respective parties. They agreed to do this, but as they considered that the diagrams would take about 48 hours to prepare, a further meeting was arranged for Monday, the 21st, in the Signals School. At the same time, I asked if a large room might be put at our disposal in the Hansa building which was occupied by 4/SKL III. Captain Kupfer insisted that we should have two rooms, and promised that they would be ready by the next day.

At this first meeting with Captains Lucan and Kupfer, Captain Lucan showed every sign of being politely difficult, while Captain Kupfer appeared very willing to cooperate. Admiral Krauss had become a little more used to us by now and was warming up under the extremely skilful handling of Lieutenant Connell. We left the meeting with the impression that, given a normal amount of luck from now on, we might get what we wanted.

Meanwhile, the Army officers had contacted a Colonel Kettler, who turned out to be the head of the 'Y' side of OKW/Chi, and who had his headquarters in a country pub between Flensburg and Schleswig. Colonel Kettler did not look to be much of a cop at the time, but in the end led the party on to Drs. Huettenhain and Fricke, who were both of the greatest value, and also located for us the OKW/Chi records at Bad Schliersee.

As Colonel Quill was expected to reach Kiel that evening, the party returned by the Kiel road, and we were lucky enough to meet on the way. Progress with Admiral Krauss was reported, and I was asked to attend a general meeting of 30 A.U. Team leaders on the next day. On our return to Neumuenster in the evening, we found Lieutenant Nuelsen who had got back from G.C.H.Q.

20.5.45: As the exploitation of the Neumuenster target was now almost completed, a party was sent off to Ploen in the three-tonner to collect what equipment of value to TICOM could be found there. There was very little worth having, but what there was was brought back to Neumuenster.

The meeting of the 30 A.U. Team leaders was held at Kiel in the Walther-Werke in the afternoon. Colonel Quill explained that now that hostilities had ceased, he was proposing to return the Marine Commando troops to England at the earliest possible date, and so wanted to know how soon TICOM Team 6 could be clear of Neumuenster. He proposed that a forward H.Q. should be set up at Eckernfoerde, and that all remaining personnel from Neumuenster and Kiel should be moved there. This plan was quite acceptable to Team 6 so long as we were allowed a few more days for packing at Neumuenster. As a base for our purposes, Eckernfoerde had the advantage of being within an hour of Flensburg by road.

21.5.45: My party for 4/SKL, with Lieutenant Nuelsen added, and the military party were both back in Flensburg by lunch time. While we went over the diagrams of 4/SKL II and 4/SKL III with Captains Lucan and Kupfer, the military party interrogated Colonel Kettler and Dr. Huettenhain, who turned out to be the senior OKW/Chi cryptanalyst.

It was clear from the 4/SKL diagrams that the next part of the job would be a detailed interrogation of the members of Captain Kupfer's party in order to distinguish the intelligence officers from the cryptanalysts, and to locate any missing bodies. We decided to start work at 10 o'clock on the morning of the 23rd, and made arrangements accordingly. After this



meeting in Admiral Krauss's room, Captain Kupfer took us over to the Hansa building and showed us the rooms that had been prepared for our occupation. Both parties returned to Neumuenster in the evening, where the diagrams were photographed and explanatory notes on the 4/SKL III diagram were prepared by Lieutenant Nuelsen. I decided that these diagrams and the notes were of such importance that they should be flown to TICOM in the care of Major Morrison at the earliest possible opportunity.

22.5.45: By this date, the material from Neumuenster and Floen, which was to be sent back for TICOM was packed in the three-tonner and ready for shipment. It was proposed to send the three-tonner, fully loaded, with one officer and a driver, to G.C.H.Q. at the earliest opportunity. In the afternoon I went up to Flensburg with Lieutenant Nuelsen, as we had decided that throughout the period of the coming interrogations it would be easier for us to live in one of the accommodation ships. That night we slept in the Hamburg-Amerika liner "Caribia", and during the night all the officers in the ship were informed that no one was to leave the ship until further orders.

23.5.45: At 0700 Major Morrison left Neumuenster for Lueneburg on his way to G.C.H.Q. with the diagrams.

In Flensburg we had no idea of the reason for our confinement in the accommodation ship, but as a great number of press representatives had turned up the night before, and the general buzz had it that Grand Admiral Doenitz was to visit the "Patria" on that morning, we imagined that we were being kept in so as not to get in the way of the show. At about 10 o'clock Grand Admiral Doenitz and his staff went on board the "Patria", and we were released at about 11.30. I set off at once for the Signals School with Lieutenant Nuelsen and Lieutenant Connell, but the moment that we got into the town we could see that something serious had gone wrong. What had happened in fact was that the Army, who had arrived shortly after midnight in Flensburg, were engaged in "cleaning up" the town, and part of this process unfortunately involved a raid on the Signals School. When we arrived at the Signals School gate we were seen off very sharply by a harassed corporal, who took us for German Naval officers going to work. It took a great deal of conversation in very plain English to persuade him that we were Allied Naval officers working in the Signals School, but he believed us in the end and showed us where the Army H.Q. was situated and where we would find the Brigadier. Fortunately, the military H.Q. was only 200 yards up the road from the Signals School gate, and so we had found the Brigadier in a matter of 5 minutes and explained that we were working with Captain Kupfer and his party and were anxious to get in touch with them. Unfortunately, he had no idea where they would be, and it was immediately clear that we would be very lucky to prevent their removal from Flensburg. As Captain Kupfer had proved so cooperative to date, I was most anxious that neither he nor any of his people should be placed in any form of Army concentration camp, as I was sure that contact with other prisoners would prove disastrous, quite apart from the danger of losing contact. The Brigadier told us that he was perfectly willing to help us find anyone we wanted, but that if their names occurred on his black list he would certainly send them off to Lueneburg. We immediately set off to find Captain Maund. When Captain Maund had been located in the N.O.I.C.'s office, he agreed at once to ask the Brigadier to release Kupfer and his men, and all that remained was to find them among the very large herds of angry prisoners that were collected in every open space in the town. In this the Brigadier was most helpful. He provided a loudspeaker car, and Lieutenant Connell was put inside and went off calling for Captain Kupfer. In the end most of the Signals School personnel were located at about 1 o'clock on the football ground. We got Captain Kupfer out of the crowd, and told him that we would return after lunch to try and get on with the interrogation.

TOP SECRET 'U'

- 17 -

I went up to the football ground several times in the early afternoon, but as there was no sign of the prisoners being released before 4 o'clock, and as none of the Germans had had anything to eat since breakfast and were all quite badly shaken up, I decided that it would not be possible to do any work on that day. At about 3.30 we located Captain Kupfer again in the middle of the mob on the football ground and, after assuring him that everything would be all right in the end, we arranged a further meeting for 11 o'clock the next morning. I set off at once for Neumuenster as I wished to see Major Evans, who was handing over our Marine troop and leaving in the morning for Formation Headquarters at Minden. Lieutenant Nuelsen remained at Flensburg in the "Caribia".

24.5.45: The plan for the interrogation of the 4/SKL III personnel was that the TICOM party should appear as officers who were not experts in any branch of signal intelligence, but who had been sent out to locate and identify the German Sigint parties. With this in view, questions were asked only on what 4/SKL III did, and whenever the specialists in that party wanted to get on to how they did it we always expressed ignorance in these matters, and told them that further expert interrogation would be undertaken by another party which would appear at some later date.

In order to get the story clearly to TICOM, we decided that the only possibility was to take the whole of the interrogation in shorthand in the original language and, after photographing, to fly the originals back to G.C.H.Q. For this purpose Captain Kupfer provided two shorthand-typists.

On the 24th I returned to Flensburg first thing in the morning and went off at once with Lieutenant Connell to the Signals School where Lieutenant Nuelsen had been having a "quiet talk" with Captain Kupfer for about an hour. The object in this talk was to calm everyone down after the disturbances of the day before, and in this it was successful in so far as the same attitude of complete cooperation prevailed. On our arrival we got down to business in our own room. Captain Kupfer brought in Ob.Reg. Rat Tranow, Chief Cryptanalyst, Amtsrat Schwabe, Amtsrat Schultze, Dip.Ing. Schmaltz (Hollerith machinery) and Lt. Boex, Captain Kupfer's interpreter and confidential secretary. Lieutenant Connell acted as interpreter for the English party.

We started the ball rolling by asking Ob.Reg. Rat Tranow to give us an outline of the building up and working of his party. He started off on a long historical description and, after a little prompting to begin with, he soon got into his stride and merely needed steering in the right direction. The stenographer took it all down, and we only had to sit back and listen. When Tranow had finished, the others all spoke in turn, giving detailed accounts of what they had done and answering all questions quite frankly, even going out of their way to explain points which they thought would not be clear to us in our "non-expert" capacity. Several times during the interrogation we enquired after dumps of material that might have been made at any point in the moves from Eberswalde to Aurich, to Neumuenster, to Flensburg, but they all stated definitely that but for the original archive dump in Berlin, of which Captain Kupfer gave us the address, everything except Hollerith machinery had been destroyed.

At the end of the day I asked for a list of all the officers in the Department who had ever had any success as cryptanalysts, whether they were in Flensburg with the Department or had been dropped at various points on the way. This list was promised for the next morning.

Lieutenant Nuelsen and I returned to the ship surprised and satisfied with the day's work. It appeared from this first interrogation that we were going to be successful beyond all reasonable expectation.

25.5.45: Before the interrogation on the morning of the 25th was started, Captain Kupfer's interpreter asked if Captain Kupfer might speak to me privately. I immediately thought that he had had a change of heart overnight and was going to prove sticky as he still held the shorthand notes of the day before which, at the best, could only have been half converted into typescript by this time. However, it turned out that he wished to confess to two dumps of cryptanalytic material which he had made secretly without the knowledge of the members of his Department. His reason for making these dumps, which were situated one near Neumuenster and another on the Elbe near Torgau, in the Russian zone, was in order that he should have access to such books and records as he considered essential to further work, whether his Department was evacuated in a northerly or a southerly direction. He provided lists of contents of both dumps, and the addresses of two of his personal friends in whose houses these dumps had been made.

The interrogation then continued in the same way as that on the previous day. During the morning Captain Kupfer himself explained the working of the intelligence side of his organisation, and in the afternoon Captain Lucan brought in three of the 4/SKL II officers and gave an explanation of the general outline of the 'Y' intercept system, and an outline of the system of cypher distribution and security. We knew all this latter part backwards, of course, but thought we should get it on the record and also that interrogating officers in our supposed position would be expected to ask for it. By the late afternoon of the 25th we had got typescripts of the interrogations of the 24th and the morning of the 25th. Lieutenant Nuelsen and I returned to Neumuenster with these, and they were photographed and prepared for dispatch to G.C.H.Q. with Captain Horsfield.

26.5.45: In the morning Captain Horsfield flew out from Lueneburg with the texts of the interrogations and copies of the lists of dumped material with their locations. The three-tonner with the equipment from Ploen and Neumuenster had already left for England, and as nothing remained to be done at Neumuenster, the whole party moved over to Eckernfoerde during the day and set up SCU "BARNY" there.

In view of the obvious value of the 4/SKL III personnel at Flensburg it was decided to hurry on preparations for flying them to England. It was still assumed, of course, that no interrogation on cryptanalytic subjects would be permitted in the field.

Senior Personnel of 4/SKL II and III held in the Signals School awaiting Expert Interrogation, 27.5.45 to 14.6.45.

The period following the identification and location of the valuable personnel in 4/SKL II and III was one of considerable difficulty. Following the general rule laid down by TICOM that no interrogation on cryptanalysis could be undertaken in the field, we were naturally under the impression that TICOM would wish the cryptanalysts, at any rate, to be flown to England and, in view of the great number of persons involved, we began to contact likely sources of large aircraft. Meanwhile, the problem of holding these personnel until such time as they could be flown was pressing. The last thing we wanted to do was to get them into detention, as for example in the camp which was forming at Schloss Glucksburg, for the accommodation of senior German officers, because we felt that contact with disgruntled senior officers would produce immediately an alteration in the prisoners' present attitude of cooperation. On the other hand, if they were not to be locked up they would have to be kept in the Signals School and continuously occupied. To take the question of employment first, we had discovered that throughout the period between the German collapse and the first interrogations, the whole department of 4/SKL III were occupied in monitoring the broadcasts of the world news agencies and in the production of a daily news sheet for the benefit of senior officers in OKM and in the Control Commission. We

suggested at once that they could improve the service by producing an English version for the benefit of the officers in the Control Commission who had no German, as this would occupy all their linguists and cryptanalysts in translating and editorial capacities. The scheme was put before the Control Commission by Lieutenant Commander Karminski, who fully appreciated the urgency of the question of employment. The Control Commission accepted the addition of an English version and promised, if necessary, to read it. Almost immediately, Captain Kupfer, who is a keen propagandist, began to expand this idea to cover a news service to the main German Naval bases, and started to write a paper on the value of a news service as a deterrent to rumour and subversive influences. Seeing that this expansion of activities would occupy Captain Kupfer fully and keep him interested in holding his department together, we gave it every encouragement.

The disadvantage in holding our personnel in the Signals School indefinitely lay in the fact that a great number of "experts" of all sorts were arriving in Flensburg almost daily, and many of them were desperately in need of subject for "expert" interrogation. We had observed that many of the senior German Naval officers, when contacted by people who were either interrogating them on subjects not their own, or interrogating them on their own subjects but with an imperfect background, were badly affected and tended to resent interrogation in any form. In order to avoid this kind of thing in the Signals School, and particularly in the Hansa building, we approached both Captain Maund and Lieutenant Commander Karminski, and asked them if all interrogators could be steered off the personnel of 4/SKL III at any rate. The personnel of 4/SKL II were obviously liable to interrogation by officers of the Signals Division, and so we felt that there was nothing that we could do about them. Lieutenant Commander Karminski, however, guaranteed that 4/SKL III should be left alone, and only one case of interrogation of Captain Kupfer by a speculator occurred in the whole period. He, fortunately, realised that he had got the wrong man almost at once and, even more than that, as he had at one time been connected with G.C.H.Q. and had visited the Park, he realised what he had got into and sheered off immediately.

At the same time, we felt that it was equally important to keep the 4/SKL III party clear of German influences. I suggested to Captain Kupfer that he should become entirely responsible for the movements of his own people, and he agreed at once to keep them in the Signals School and to discourage contact with the outside world.

This period was also the most difficult in our relations and communications with TICOM. At about the time of our first contact with Admiral Krauss, a Lieutenant Morgenroth had been picked up by the army, and was almost immediately contacted by Lieutenant Colonel Brown. This Morgenroth had been with 4/SKL III at some time, working on minor codes, but more recently had been doing a translating job with some other department. However, he knew the personnel of 4/SKL III, and gave Lieutenant Colonel Brown a short list of such as he could remember who should be in Flensburg. This list was the main cause of the difficulty. TICOM at G.C.H.Q. used this list to advise us as to whom we should pick up, but we in the field were very soon in a position where we were in close contact with the whole of Captain Kupfer's department. This contact immediately exposed errors and omissions in the list, as was only natural, but we in the field assumed that TICOM would be aware of these errors and omissions through receipt of the diagrams and transcriptions of interrogations flown back with Major Morrison and Captain Horsfield. Unfortunately, this was not so. By a pure mischance, the diagrams and reports showing how far we had got with Captains Kupfer and Lucan were filed away by TICOM, and neither translated nor circulated. The result was a continuous misunderstanding, which lasted until Lieutenant Nuelsen returned to G.C.H.Q. on the 2nd of June and discovered what had gone wrong.

TOP SECRET 'U'

- 20 -

27.5.45: Lieutenant Commander Griffiths and Lieutenant Lorton arrived by plane from England and reached Eckernfoerde by the middle of the day. As Lieutenant Nuelsen was leaving immediately to pick up the documents dumped near Neumuenster, I took Lieutenant Commander Griffiths and Lieutenant Lorton up to Flensburg with me so that we would always have somebody sleeping in the ship. Lieutenant Lorton had come out to join the Team in order to collect all our equipment and see to its packing and safe return to G.C.H.Q. My normal routine at this time was to go into the Signals School at 10 o'clock in the morning, work at something imaginary in my room till about 11.30, so as to give Captain Kupfer or Lieutenant Boex a chance to come and talk if they wanted to, and then leave for Eckernfoerde to make my daily contact with the Team and go through any signals that had appeared during the night. I would then wait in Eckernfoerde until the afternoon communication routine was over, and then return to Flensburg for the night. I usually called in the office in the evening to see if all was quiet.

28.5.45: The morning of the 28th was spent in discussion with Captain Kupfer on the future of his party and in visits to the OKM Control Commission to put into operation the plan for occupying 4/SKL III as outlined above.

On this day we were informed by TICOM that no further prisoners could be flown to U.K. Unfortunately, it was not made clear that the prisoners never would be flown, and I got the impression that this was merely a delay due to overcrowding in the transport aircraft. Throughout the whole period I never suggested to Captain Kupfer's party that they were in any danger of being sent to England, as I felt this might cause alarm and despondency. I always gave them the impression that as soon as it was possible, specialist interrogators would come out to Flensburg to deal with their particular problem. One of our minor difficulties was the constant irritation of Captain Kupfer's cryptanalysts at the delay in the arrival of the interrogating party. The cryptanalysts felt they had done a very good job and had something important to say, and were always annoyed at delays in interrogation.

29.5.45: On the 29th we were informed by TICOM that the personnel required for interrogation would not be sent back to U.K. and that Lieutenant Colonel Brown was making arrangements for them to be held in a camp in the 21st Army Group area, where they could be interrogated and then transferred to U.K. if the expert interrogators considered such transfer necessary. I at once approached Lieutenant Commander Tamplin of 30 A.U. to see if he could provide us with sufficient transport to shift the personnel to Lueneburg, and he offered five scout cars which would be held ready against the event.

30.5.45: Lieutenant Nuelsen, meanwhile, had collected the near dump, consisting of three boxes of papers, and had gone off in search of the second dump on the Elbe. He took Ensign Phillips with him, and they proposed to have a look at the "Goliath" transmitter, of which Captain Kupfer had given the position, on the way.

At the same time, I was getting to work to locate Lieutenant Colonel Brown in order to discuss the problem of handing over the prisoners.

31.5.45: On the 31st, Lieutenant Nuelsen returned and reported that No. 1 dump, as we called it, the one on the Elbe near Torgau, was definitely in Russian territory. He had contacted the nearest American authorities, who considered that when the final line between the Russian and American zones was drawn, it might be possible to get at this material. One of the difficulties about these dumps was that the friends of Captain Kupfer, who were holding them, were quite unaware that the contents of the boxes were anything but Captain Kupfer's personal effects, and so it was of the first importance that no attention should be drawn to their presence in the Russian zone. During the trip Lieutenant Nuelsen had been to Captain Kupfer's home and made contact with his wife, who had told him that she was under the impression that the holder of the Torgau dump had already been arrested by the Russians as the senior member of his community. In view of all this, it was decided that Lieutenant Nuelsen should fly out at the earliest opportunity, carrying corrections and emendations to previous statements by members of 4/SKL III, and to give TICOM a clear description of the situation relating to the dumps. Captain Kupfer made it quite clear that the dumps were of equal value from our point of view, as both contained the same types of material.

1.6.45: I then sent Lieutenant Morgan and Lieutenant Kirby off to locate Lieutenant Colonel Brown. In fact, Lieutenant Colonel Brown was no longer in Germany, having flown back to G.C.H.Q. However, they contacted Lieutenant Colonel Winterbotham at 12th Army, who informed them of the general situation and also gave his opinion that the proposed camp for prisoners could not possibly be formed under 3 weeks. This news, combined with the fact that it was quite clear that the prisoners were not wanted in England, was all rather disturbing. The Control Commission at Flensburg were getting on with the disbanding of OKM and, sooner or later, would want to tackle the Signals School, but I felt that, as Captain Kupfer's people were in such good condition, I should do everything possible to keep them out of camps and in their own building in the Signals School.

2.6.45: In view of this, I proposed to TICOM that I should go to Army Group and try and reach some arrangement about the prisoners, but as a meeting to decide their fate was being held at G.C.H.Q. on the next day, such a visit was considered undesirable.

Lieutenant Commander Griffiths had been asked to return by D.D.(N.S.) and as we had collected all the material and equipment that we were likely to find, I decided to send off the Dodge six-wheeler at the earliest possible moment with Lieutenant Commander Griffiths, Lieutenant Gaschk and Ensign Phillips. The six-wheeler was loaded with our own effects and the contents of the dump which had been recovered, and SCU "CALIF".

On this day Lieutenant Nuelsen arrived back at G.C.H.Q.

3.6.45: The situation with regard to the prisoners was now further complicated by the fact that it was decided to collect the six people on the list that Lieutenant Morgenroth had given to Lieutenant Colonel Brown. Unfortunately, Captain Kupfer was on this list, and if he had been removed to England and we had been left in Flensburg with all his cryptanalysts, it might have proved difficult to control them. Lieutenant Colonel Brown and TICOM were, of course, unaware of the information on the Flensburg prisoners which had been flown out with Captain Horsfield, and it was not until the second day of Lieutenant Nuelsen's visit to G.C.H.Q. that he realised that they had no idea of the general Flensburg situation. The result of all this was that Lieutenant Colonel Winterbotham informed me that he was sending to Flensburg for the six prisoners at the first opportunity. Of these six men, one was Captain Kupfer who was essential to us, some were not held by us at all as they were already in Schloss Glucksburg, and a third category were not in the Flensburg area at all.

On top of this, TICOM informed me that I was wanted urgently at G.C.H.Q.

On this day the party in the Dodge six-wheeler left for home.

4.6.45: The business of handing over the prisoners had already been further complicated without our knowledge. During my normal visit to Eckernfoerde on the 4th, Captain Maund dropped in for tea in the mess on his way back from Kiel. I had not seen him for two or three days, and he told me that on the evening of the 2nd, an Army officer had called at the "Patria" to collect the six prisoners whom he thought that we were holding. Lieutenant Kirby was in the ship at the time, as we had been expecting someone to turn up, but this officer failed to contact him and got on to the Control Commission, and eventually Lieutenant Commander Karminski and Captain Maund. As both these officers knew that we had succeeded in rescuing our people from the Army once and, as the officer from 12th Army had no signal authorising the removal of the prisoners, the Control Commission (very fortunately as it turned out) refused to give them up. The officer, who was under the impression that he was dealing with TICOM, returned on the 3rd to Lueneburg and, quite naturally, reported that TICOM had refused to hand over. This incident upset the relations between TICOM and C.S.D.I.C. and must have infuriated Lieutenant Colonel Brown, who was taking a great deal of trouble to help us with the prisoners, but was quite unaware of the situation in Flensburg. On top of this there was a most unusual tangle over TICOM's signal to Team 6 requesting an explanation. This was the only occasion when communications went wrong, and it can really be put down to bad luck more than anything else. What happened, in fact, was that signal requesting an explanation was never sent as the text of the signal before was recyphered and sent out with the next serial number, and when we asked for a repeat we got the same text a third time. This all caused a delay of two days in sorting out the muddle and a great deal of regrettable confusion.

5.6.45: On the 5th of June we were informed that no arrangements could be made to move cryptanalysts to England, that TICOM was now planning to interrogate on cryptanalytic matters in Flensburg, and that the circumstances relating to the movement of prisoners to England had forced TICOM to abandon their original policy on the interrogation of cryptanalysts in the field. This new arrangement was obviously the best that could be made in the circumstances.

6.6.45: I reported the new policy with regard to interrogation to the Control Commission, and at the same time Captain Maund told me that he was anxious to disperse all German parties who were not performing some essential work in the programme of disbanding the German Navy. At this moment, fortunately, Captain Kupfer brought out his completed plan for the expansion of the news service to the main German Naval bases. We got to work on the paper and polished it up a bit, and Lieutenant Commander Karminski brought it to the notice of the senior officers of the Control Commission, who forwarded it to A.N.C.X.F. in Paris. The scheme itself involved the reopening of teleprinter communications with Kiel and Wilhelmshaven, and this was obviously such a large question that we could hope for a discussion carrying on over several days and, until a decision was reached, we felt that there would be no danger of the dispersal of the personnel in 4/SKL III.

On this day also, Lieutenant Nuelsen got back from G.C.H.Q. and explained the cause of TICOM's failure to understand the situation in Flensburg. This explanation cleared the air and removed all cause for misunderstanding.

7.6.45: The next day the Control Commission informed us that they would not touch 4/SKL III for the moment, but were most anxious to close down 4/SKL II. We provided a list of eight members of 4/SKL II who would be of value for interrogation, and these officers were passed over to Schloss Glucksburg as prisoners. I did not mind these officers going, as 4/SKL II had never been so cooperative as 4/SKL III.

Now that Lieutenant Nuelsen had returned, I decided to leave for G.C.H.Q. myself, as there was nothing more that could be done in Flensburg, and it only remained to wait for the arrival of the interrogators.

8.6.45: I went up to the Control Commission in the morning to tell Captain Maund that I was going to England and leaving Lieutenant Nuelsen in charge, and he told me that he proposed closing down the Signals School on Tuesday, the 12th, but that in view of the value of the prisoners in 4/SKL III as a team, they might be kept together and carry on with their news sheet after being removed to the OKM buildings at Glucksburg, or to some other convenient base of operations. At the same time we were informed by TICOM that they intended to send out a team of interrogators led by Commander Dudley Smith at the earliest possible date. I passed this news on to Captain Maund, who asked me to impress TICOM with the need for speed in getting on with the interrogation, which I promised to do.

9.6.45: I left for England at midday, leaving Lieutenant Nuelsen in charge. In the afternoon Lieutenant Laptok got back to Eckernfoerde with the three-tonner, to pick up the final load for G.C.H.Q.

10.6.45: Lieutenant Nuelsen began the preliminary arrangements for the interrogation. He paid a visit to Schloss Glucksburg to check all the personnel held there who would be wanted by Commander Dudley Smith.

As there was now nothing further to be done, and all material which we had been asked to collect, and which we had been able to find, was now packed and ready for transport, Lieutenant Nuelsen decided to move everyone off for England as soon as possible, and to bring SCU "BARNY" up to Flensburg and instal it in the "Patria".

I reached G.C.H.Q. and made a verbal report to TICOM.

11.6.45: Lieutenant Nuelsen moved the team from Eckernfoerde to Flensburg. SCU "BARNY" was set up in the wireless room of the "Patria".

12.6.45: Lieutenant Nuelsen completed the arrangements for billeting the interrogating party, and continued with the rounding up of the personnel wanted for interrogation.

13.6.45: Sub Lieutenant Morgan, with one driver, left for G.C.H.Q. in the Utilicon.

14.6.45: Early in the morning the large ammunition dump on the hill near the Signals School began to blow up in a series of very heavy explosions. The ship was temporarily abandoned as severe fires had broken out and were spreading towards the mine dump. By midday the fires were considered to be under control, and the party moved back into the ship. In the evening Commander Dudley Smith's interrogating party of six officers arrived in Flensburg.



The Interrogations and the Return of Team 6 to G.C.H.Q.  
15.6.45 to 5.7.45.

The interrogations were carried on in Flensburg from the 15th to the 23rd, but as they were conducted by Commander Dudley Smith's party, who were not a part of Team 6, a detailed report of them will have been made elsewhere. During this time Lieutenant Nuelsen, Lieutenant Lorton and Lieutenant Kirby remained in Flensburg, keeping the communications open. It was decided by TICOM that after these interrogations no holding party would be necessary in Flensburg, and that the prisoners who were still wanted should be left in the hands of the Army.

15.6.45 to 23.6.45: The interrogations went on daily throughout this period.

24.6.45: The party transferred with SCU "BARNY" from the "Patria" to the "Caribia".

25.6.45: The interrogating party began to leave for England. Lieutenant Lorton and Lieutenant Kirby went to Kiel to investigate OKL Chef TLR, E 4, but found that the site had been completely bombed out.

26.6.45: Lieutenant Nuelsen completed arrangements to have all the 4/SKL III personnel who might be required for further interrogation held in Flensburg, and for the Forschungsamt personnel to be transferred to DUSTBIN.

27.6.45: It had been decided that Dr. Huettenhain and Dr. Fricke should be flown to England, and arrangements for their passage were now completed.

28.6.45: Lieutenant Colonel Brown arrived in Flensburg to look the situation over generally, and to pick up Drs. Huettenhain and Fricke. He concurred that a TICOM holding party in Flensburg was no longer necessary.

29.6.45: Lieutenant Nuelsen made arrangements to have all "Fish" machinery in the Signals School held pending further orders as to disposal from TICOM.

30.6.45: Lieutenant Colonel Brown, with two escorting officers, left for England with Drs. Huettenhain and Fricke.

1.7.45: SCU "BARNY" closed down.

2.7.45: At 0800 Lieutenant Nuelsen, Lieutenant Lorton, W/T operator Roberts and driver Hewetson left in the jeep and the three-tonner for G.C.H.Q. Lieutenants Kirby and Laptook had already flown out on their way back to the U.S. The party reached Zutphen by the night of the 2nd.

3.7.45: The party reached Calais.

4.7.45: The party boarded LCT. Reached Dover at 1600 and arrived at G.C.H.Q. at 2200.

5.7.45: All machinery, documents and equipment were handed over, and Lieutenant Nuelsen made his verbal report to TICOM.

A.M.S. MACKENZIE,  
Commander, R.N.V.R.